Consciousness

Over the course of these 8 lectures we’ll consider philosophical discussion of the nature of consciousness, and why it has posed a particular problem for philosophers of mind.

Lecture 1: The Hard Problem of Consciousness and the explanatory gap

This lecture starts with a (very) brief overview of philosophy of mind, to help us understand why consciousness has posed a particular problem for philosophers. We critically consider David Chalmers’ distinction between hard and easy problems of consciousness, and his zombie argument.

Recommended reading:

*David Chalmers, ‘Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness’ Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3) 200-219 (1995)
Joseph Levine, ‘Materialism and qualia: the explanatory gap’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (1986) 356-61
Patricia Churchland, (1996). The Hornswoggle Problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (5-6) 402-8
David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (1996)

Lecture notes available here

Lecture 2: The Knowledge Argument

In this lecture we critically consider Frank Jackson’s argument against physicalism, that a scientist, Mary, who had comprehensive theoretical knowledge of colour perception, but had spent all her life in a black and white room, would not know what it was like to see colour.

Recommended reading:

*Jackson, Frank, 'Epiphenomenal Qualia', Philosophical Quarterly, 32, no. 127 (1982): 127-36.
Lewis, David, 'What Experience Teaches', in W.G. Lycan, ed., Mind and Cognition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), pp. 499-519.
Dennett, Daniel C. (2006). What robomary knows. In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
Nagel, Thomas, 'What Is It Like to Be a Bat?' The Philosophical Review, 83, no. 4 (1974): 435-50.
Akins, Kathleen (1993). What is it like to be boring and myopic? In B. Dahlbom (ed.), Dennett and His Critics. Blackwell.

Lecture notes available here

Lecture 3: Panpsychism

In this lecture, we’ll consider whether panpsychism (the view that everything possesses conscious properties) offers an account of consciousness that avoids some of the difficulties faced by functionalism or dualism. Is it, in turn, hamstrung by the combination problem? We’ll also use this lecture as a buffer if we have material left over from the previous two lectures.

Recommended reading:

Chalmers, David. The Combination Problem for Panpsychism. In Godehard Brüntrup & Ludwig Jaskolla (eds.), Panpsychism. (2016) Oxford University Press.
Hassel Mørch, Hedda, ‘Is Matter Conscious?’ Nautilus Magazine April 6 2017. Available at http://nautil.us/issue/47/consciousness/is-matter-conscious
Goff, Philip. Experiences don't sum. Journal of Consciousness Studies (2006) 13 (10-11):53-61.

Lecture notes available here as a word document and here as a PDF.

Lecture 4: Phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness

Ned Block has proposed a distinction between two kinds of consciousness, phenomenal consciousness, and access consciousness. We consider the empirical evidence that is supposed to motivate this distinction, and some philosophical upshots of it.

Recommended reading:

*Block, Ned, 'On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness', Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18, no. 2 (1995): 227-47.
Phillips, Ian, 'Perception and Iconic Memory: What Sperling Doesn’t Show', Mind & Language, 26 (2011): 381-411.
Rosenthal, David, 'Two Concepts of Consciousness', Philosophical Studies, 49, no. 3 (1986): 329-59.

Lecture notes available here as pdf and here as a word document

Lecture 5: Is consciousness rich or sparse?

Following on from the previous lecture we continue to consider the question of whether phenomenal consciousness overflows cognitive access, asking whether our impression of a rich, conscious phenomenology is in fact illusory. What is the significance of phenomena like change blindness or gist perception?

Recommended reading:

Dennet, Daniel Consciousness Explained Penguin. (1991) Ch.5
Phillips, Ian, 'Perception and Iconic Memory: What Sperling Doesn’t Show', Mind & Language, 26 (2011): 381-411.
Noë, Alva. 'Is the visual world a grand illusion?' Journal of consciousness studies 9.5-6 (2002): 1-12.

Lecture notes available here as word document and here as pdf

Lecture 6: Intentional theories of consciousness

What is the relationship between consciousness and content? Can the content of mental states account for our phenomenal experience of them?

Recommended reading:

*Block, Ned, 'Inverted Earth', Philosophical Perspectives, 4 (1990): 53-79. https://doi.org/10.2307/2214187. Reprinted in Block, above.
Harman, Gilbert, 'The Intrinsic Quality of Experience', Philosophical Perspectives, 4 (1990): 31-52. https://doi.org/10.2307/2214186.
Kind, Amy, 'Transparency and Representationalist Theories of Consciousness', Philosophy Compass, 5, no. 10 (2010): 902-13. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00328.x.

Lecture notes available here as word document and here as pdf

Lecture 7: Higher order theories of consciousness

Does consciousness require inner awareness? Does higher order awareness of an inner state render it conscious?

Recommended reading:

*Dretske, Fred, 'Conscious Experience', Mind, 1 (1993): 263-83. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2253868.
*Rosenthal, David M., 'The Independence of Consciousness and Sensory Quality', Philosophical Issues, 1, no. 406 (1991): 15-36. https://doi.org/10.2307/1522921.

Unfortunately this lecture was cancelled due to strike action.

Lecture 8: The Unity of Consciousness

Can a single subject have two streams of consciousness at the same time? What does empirical evidence of what happens when the corpus callosum is severed tell us about this possibility?

Recommended reading:

Bayne, Tim, and David Chalmers, 'What Is the Unity of Consciousness?' in A. Cleeremans, ed., The Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration, Dissociation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 23-58.
Schechter, Elizabeth 'Two Unities of Consciousness.' European Journal of Philosophy 21:2 (2013).197-218.

Unfortunately this lecture was cancelled due to strike action.